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On the growth and use of a symbolical
language
Hugh MacColl
EDITOR'S NOTE
[Editors’ note: This paper was communicated by the Rev. Robert Harley, F. R. S., and read
at the Ordinary meeting of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society on 22 March
1881. The full paper, signed “Hugh M’Coll, Esq., BA.”, appeared first (without the abstract)
in the Memoirs of the Society, series 3, 7, 1882, 225--248. The (English) abstract below
appeared first in the Proceedings of the Society, 20 (8), session 1880-1881, 103. The French
abstract below has been provided by the editors.]
1 In an article on “Symbolical Reasoning”, in a recent number of ‘Mind’ (no 17, Jan. 1880), I
have described the relation between symbolical reasoning and ordinary verbal reasoning
as analogous to that between machine labour and ordinary manual labour. To trace this
analogy through all its various points of resemblance would take too long; but there is
one point  which deserves some notice,  as  it  bears  more especially  upon the present
subject. 
2 For what kinds of operations are machines usually invented? A little reflection will show
that one common and prominent characteristic of such operations is sameness; we employ
machines to perform operations which have to be frequently repeated, and repeated in the same
unvarying manner. Sewing-machines, knitting-machines, reaping-machines, and, in fact,
the great  generality  of  machines,  however  widely  they may differ  in  other  respects,
resemble each other in this.
3 For what kinds of expressions and relations, mathematical or logical, do we usually invent
symbols? We shall find, as before, that the common characteristic of such expressions and
relations is sameness—that they are expressions and relations which have to be repeated
frequently. When any complex expression or relation is perceived to have a tendency to
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recur  again  and  again,  we  economize  thought,  time,  and  space  if  we  denote  this
expression or relation by some simple, suggestive, and easily formed symbol which we
may always recognize as doing duty for its more complex equivalent.
4 The representive symbols thus invented combine afterwards among themselves into new
expressions and relations of more or less complexity, and give birth, in their turn, when
the necessity or convenience arises, to fresh representative symbols, whose abbreviating
power bears, on an average, the same ratio to that of the symbols they displace, as the
abbreviating power of the latter bears to that of their immediate progenitors. In strict
conformity with this law of symbolical growth the science of mathematics has gradually
attained its present wonderful power within the limits of its application; and in strict
conformity with the same law, the science of logic, which is now evidently entering on
quite a new phase of existence, will probably before long, and within much wider limits of
application, surpass the achievements of mathematical science itself.
5 Now it is clear that the power and progress of any symbolical language must depend very
largely upon the judgment exercised, first, as to whether, in any proposed case, a new
symbol is really required, or would on the whole be useful, and, secondly (supposing the
need of a new symbol to be admitted), as to the kind of symbol that should be selected.
With regard to the first point, we must remember that the introduction of a fresh symbol
is always accompanied by the disadvantage that it adds a fresh item to the load which the
memory has to carry, and it is only when its advantages more than outweigh this very
serious drawback that it  should be admitted as a permanent addition to the existing
vocabulary. Can we discover any general principles or rules which should guide us in this
important matter of admission or rejection? Let us examine a few of the symbols which
we now possess, and see whether any such rules can be discovered.
6 The ratio which the circumference of a circle has to its diameter, namely, 3.14159 &c., is
one that occurs frequently, and for this reason mathematicians express it by a single
arbitrary symbol π.  The ratio which the diagonal of a square has to its side,  namely,
1.41421 &c., is another ratio which also occurs frequently, and yet mathematicians do not
express this by any single arbitrary symbol,  nor would any mathematician think the
introduction of such a symbol desirable. Why is this? The answer is obvious: the latter
ratio may be expressed,  without  any fresh definition or  explanation, by a very brief  and
simple combination of existing symbols, namely by the combination √2; while we know of
no brief and easily formed combination of existing symbols, requiring no fresh definition,
which would accurately and unambiguously express the former ratio.
7 From these and other analogous examples we may safely assume as one guiding principle,
that some conventional symbol of abbreviation should be used as a substitute for any
expression that has a tendency to recur frequently, provided that no suitable combination of
existing symbols (i.e.  a combination short,  simple,  and requiring no fresh definition or
explanation) can be found to replace it.
8 The next point is, as a rule, more important and also less easily decided. It is this: —
Granting the necessity for some new symbol of abbreviation, what kind of symbol should
be selected?
9 In the ease of the symbol π, to which we have already alluded, this question of suitable
selection is,  it  is  true,  of  secondary importance;  almost any arbitrary symbol of  easy
formation would have done just as well;  but this is an exception to the general rule.
Consider the symbol an, which has been invented as an abbreviation for the product of n
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equal factors, each equal to a; that is, a2 for aa, a3 for aaa, and so on. If the first of these
products, namely aa, were the only one that had a tendency to recur, we may be quite
sure that mathematicians would remain satisfied with it in its original form, and would
never have accepted the innovation a2 as its equivalent. But since aaa, aaaa, &c., have also
the same tendency of frequent recurrence, the appropriateness of the symbol selected is
evident: the numerical index reminds us of the number of equal factors; and we are at
once provided with a more effective notation for considering the properties and relations
of all  expressions that are products of equal factors, as,  for instance, in the binomial
theorem.
10 Let us now examine the raison d’être of  that remarkable class of symbols which were
invented at a more advanced stage of the science (by whom I know not), and which give
such a wonderful sweep and power to symbolical language generally, logical as well as
mathematical; I refer to that class of symbols of which f(x) may be taken as a specimen.
This  symbol  denotes  any  complex  expression  whatever (mathematical  or  logical)  that
contains the simpler expression x, in any relation whatever as one of its constituents. What
was the special need which this symbol was invented to supply?
We have often to consider what an expression would become if one of its constituents
were taken away and a fresh constituent put into its place, just as people sometimes
speculate as to what would be the effect upon a ministerial policy if a certain member of
the cabinet were to resign and a certain other person appointed in his place. If f(x) denote
the expression of which x is a constituent, then f(a) will denote the new expression which
is formed by substituting a for x. To take a simple case, let f(x) denote the algebraical
expression
then f(2) will denote 
and will be equal to 13; f(0) will denote
and will be equal to 7; f(x – 5) will denote
and will be equal to
11 The last  symbol  f(x – 5)  warns us  of  a  danger to be carefully  guarded against  in the
introduction of fresh symbols, namely the danger of ambiguity. The meaning here attached
to it might in certain cases be confounded with an older and commoner meaning; for the
symbol f(x – 5) also denotes the product of the two factors f and x – 5. How is this danger of
ambiguity to be guarded against? We might,  it  is  true,  guard against  it  by adopting,
instead of f,  a totally new symbol of some unwonted shape; but this is a course to be
avoided if possible. Strange-looking symbols somehow offend the eye; and we do not take
to them kindly, even when they are of simple and easy formation. Provided we can avoid
ambiguity, it is generally better to intrust an old symbol with new duties than to employ
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the services of a perfect stranger. In the case just considered, and in many analogous
cases, the context will be quite sufficient to prevent us from confounding one meaning
with another, just as in ordinary discourse we run no risk of confounding the meanings of
the word air in the two statements—“He assumed an air of authority,” and “He resolved
the air into its component gases.” In the special case of f(x – 5) no ambiguity exists when
the letter f is used in no other sense throughout the investigation on which we happen to
be engaged; and when it is used in another sense, all risk of confusion is obviated by
simply employing instead of f, in the expressions f(x), f(x – 5), &c., some other symbolic
letter, such as ɸ.
12 We may recapitulate the results so far arrived at thus: — 
1. A new symbol, or an old symbol with a new meaning, to be accepted as a permanent
addition to the existing stock, should represent all expression or relation that tends to
occur frequently, and that cannot be logically expressed by any short combination of
existing symbols.
2. Provided we can avoid ambiguity, it is better to employ an old symbol in a new sense
than to invent a totally new symbol.
3.  The  symbol  chosen  should  be  of  short  and  easy  formation  and  lead  to  symbolic
expressions of simple and symmetrical forms. 
13 The illustrations hitherto given have been borrowed from mathematics, because these
are  more  familiar  to  the  general  reader  than any  that  could  have  been taken from
symbolical logic; yet the latter is in every respect the simpler science of the two,—simpler
in the conceptions
F0
2A represented by symbols, simpler in the smallness of the number of
symbols employed, and simpler in the mechanical operations that have to be performed.
In claiming this advantage for logic over mathematics, I speak solely of that scheme of
symbolical logic which I, rightly or wrongly, consider the simplest and most effective,
namely the scheme which I have explained and illustrated in ‘Mind,’ in the ‘Proceedings’
of the London Mathematical Society, in the ‘Educational Times,’ and in the ‘Philosophical
Magazine’.  According  to  this  scheme  the  whole  and  sole  duty  of  the  logician  is  to
investigate the relations in which statements (i.e. assertions and denials) stand towards
each other. For all practical reasoning-purposes a statement may be defined as anything
that conveys directly through a bodily sense (as the eye or ear) any information (true or
false) to the mind. In this sense a nod or a shake of the head is a perfectly intelligible
statement. The Union-Jack fluttering from the mast of a ship conveys as clear and definite
information as the words “This is a British ship” shouted through the captain’s speaking-
trumpet; and therefore the flag is as much a statement in the logical sense as the words;
and, like the words, it may (as we know by experience) be a true or a false statement.
14 Logic, then, being concerned with statements, the analogy of ordinary algebra suggests
the propriety of denoting simple statements by single letters, and the relations in which
statements stand to each other either by the relative positions of the statement-letters, or
by  separate  and  distinct  symbols.  Therefore  a  very  important  inquiry  in  laying  the
foundation of a practical symbolical calculus for solving logical problems is this: —What
are the characteristics and relations which most frequently distinguish or connect the
statements of an argument? Foremost among distinctions we shall find that of truth and
falsehood. All intelligible statements may be divided into two great classes, the true and
the false. Every statement must belong to one or other of these two classes, though we may
not always know to which. If it were not for this element of uncertainty, reasoning would be
purposeless, and logic would have no raison d’être. This uncertainty (sometimes real and
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sometimes only hypothetical) suggests the convenience of dividing the statements of any
argument upon which we happen to be engaged into three distinct classes, the admittedly
true, the  admittedly  false, and  the  doubtful. Borrowing  a  hint  from  mathematical
probability, we may denote any statement belonging to the first class by the symbol 1,
and any statement belonging to the second class by 0,  while any doubtful  statement
(whether the doubt be real or hypothetical) may be denoted by any symbol we choose
except  these.  Now,  generally  speaking,  in  the  course  of  any  consistent  argument  or
investigation the boundaries of these three classes will be found to be gradually changing;
the first two classes, the admittedly true and the admittedly false, though never encroaching
upon each other’s ground, will both constantly encroach upon the ground of the third,
the doubtful.
15 Statements  may also,  independently  of  their  truth or  falsehood,  be divided into two
distinct classes, namely assertions and denials. Every assertion either claims or has already
obtained admission into the class denoted by the symbol ; while its denial contests its
right to this symbol, which it claims for itself, and seeks to brand it, as an impostor, with
the symbol 0. As long as these two claimants belong to the class of doubtful statements,
all that we can say about them is, that the one (either the assertion or its denial) must be
true, and the other false.
16 The denial  of  any assertion may be conveniently denoted by an accent,  thus:  —Let x
denote the statement, “He is in England;” then x' will denote “He is not in England.”
17 The  statements  hitherto  spoken  of  are  simple  or  elementary  statements—that  is,
statements represented each by a single letter,  or a single letter and an accent.  Any
statement  that  requires  more  than one  letter  to  express  it  may be  called  a  complex
statement. The principal relations by virtue of which simple statements combine into
complex ones are three—namely, conjunction, disjunction, and implication, corresponding
respectively to the three conjunctions and, or, if. The first relation is generally symbolized
(like multiplication in ordinary algebra) by simple juxtaposition, and occasionally, though
never necessarily, by the symbol ×; the second (like addition in ordinary algebra) by the
symbol +; and the third by the symbol :, as in the following examples: —
18 Let x denote the statement “He will go to Paris;” and let y denote the statement “I shall go
to York.” Then x y denotes the compound statement “He will go to Paris and I shall go to
York;” the symbol x + y denotes the disjunctive statement “He will go to Paris or I shall go
to York;” and x : ydenotes the implication “If he goes to Paris I shall go to York.”
19 A  compound  statement,  as  a b c,  claims  the  symbol  1  for  every  one of  its  factors;  a
disjunctive statement, as a + b + c, claims the symbol 1 for one at least of its terms; and the
implicational  statement a : b claims  the  symbol  1  for  the  consequent  b,  provided  the
antecedent a is entitled to it, but neither claims nor disclaims it for b if a is not entitled to it.
20 Brackets  are  used  when  necessary  to  collect  the  different  elements  of  a  complex
statement, and so prevent any uncertainty respecting to what complex statement any
element or relational symbol belongs. Thus, the compound statement a(b + c), formed by
the two factorsa and b + c, is a very different statement from the disjunctive statement ab 
+ c,  formed by the two termsab and c.  So,  again,  is  (a : b + c)',  the denial  of  the whole
implicational complex statement a : b + c,  a very different statement from a : b + c'  ,  in
which the symbol of denial affects only the element .
21 Reciprocal implications—that is, compound implications of the form (a : b)(b : c)—occur so
frequently  that  a  symbol  of  abbreviation  is  convenient.  Borrowing  again  from  the
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existent mathematical stock, we may use†either ∷ or =. Thus either the symbol a∷b or the
symbol a = b may be taken as an abbreviation for the reciprocal implication (a : b)(b : a).
22 The symbol f(x) has been already considered, and is employed in logic in the same sense
as in mathematics; that is to say, it denotes any statement whatever that contains x as one
of its constituents; but the symbol f'(x), for which no logical meaning analogous to its
mathematical one is likely to turn up, may be conveniently employed as an abbreviation
for {f(x)}'.
23 These are the only symbols that need be employed in the system of symbolical logic
which I advocate, and they are amply sufficient not only for the complete solution of any
logical  problem that  I  have ever  seen solved by any other  method,  but  also  for  the
complete solution of many problems which, I think, it would be difficult to solve by any
other method with which I am at present acquainted.
24 The rules which I have proposed for observance in introducing new symbols are, I believe,
sound,  and I  have followed them myself  to to the best  of  my ability.  As the science
advances, other symbols will, no doubt, become necessary; but they should be introduced
slowly, and not till their utility is made clearly manifest.
25 My statement in ‘Mind,’ that though a : b implies a' + b, it is not equivalent to it, has been
called in question, my critics maintaining that there is no real difference between the
conditional statement “If a is true, b is true,” and the disjunctive statement “Either a is
false or b is true.” Now, I admit at once that, in the ordinary language of life, disjunctive
statements  are  often  made  which  convey,  and  are  intended  to  convey,  a  conditional
meaning, and,  further,  that the example which I  gave in illustration,  namely “He will
either  discontinue  his  extravagance,  or  he  will  be  ruined,”  is  one  of  them.  Many
statements, however, are made in common life which are tacitly understood to convey a
stronger meaning than logically and literally belongs to them. Take, for instance, the
well-known expression, “He will never set the Thames on fire.” In its literal sense this
very harmless-sounding statement does not commit one to much;  it  may,  with equal
safety, be applied to the cleverest man living and to the most incapable idiot. What the
practical reasoner would be concerned with in making use of any evidence conveyed to
him in such terms would be the intended meaning of the speaker; and if his argument
should be of such a nature as to necessitate the employment of symbols, the symbol for
the statement should denote its intended and not its literal meaning. The real question in
dispute is  this,  does the conditional statement “If  a is  true b is  true,” as I  define and
symbolize it, convey a meaning in any way different from the disjunctive statement “Either
a is false or b is true,” as I define and symbolize it?
26 My argument in ‘Mind’ was, that since the denial of the first, namely “  a may be true
without b being so,” conveys less information than “ a is true and b is false,” which is the
denial  of  the  second,  the  conditional  disjunctive  statements  of  which  these  are  the
respective denials cannot be equivalent. As the non-equivalence of the denials, however,
is much more evident than that of the affirmative statements, it will be well worth while
to give, if possible, a more direct proof of the non-equivalence of the latter.
27 As it can easily be shown that a : b is equivalent to a' + b, the question may be narrowed to
this, is the implication 1 : α, in which α denotes a' + b, equivalent to the simple affirmation
α? It seems to me that 1 : α and α differ in pretty much the same way as the statement “It
is well-known that tin is heavier than zinc,” and the simpler affirmation “Tin is heavier
than zinc;” that is to say, the former implies the latter,  but is not implied in it.  The
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statement 1 : α, in addition to claiming the symbol 1 for itself, asserts that its protégéα has
fairly made good its right to it; whereas α only claims this symbol on its own account. The
symbol (1 : α)',  which is the denial  of  1 : α,  may be read,  “ α  is  not necessarily true;”
whereas α',  the denial of α,  is much stronger, and asserts positively that α is false. It
follows  from the  law of  logic  called  contraposition that  the  denial  of  the  weaker  (or
implied) statement is stronger than and implies the denial of the stronger (or implying)
statement.
28 The  disjunctive  statements  of  ordinary  language  may  be  divided  into  conditional
disjunctives  and  unconditional (or  pure)  disjunctives—the  former  being  those  already
referred to as conditional in meaning though disjunctive in form. Among these may be
classed the famous disjunctive of Edward I., “By God, sir Earl, you shall either go or hang”
(symbolically, g + h), the meaning of which is evidently, “If you don’t go, I will have you
hanged.” The king, by a not uncommon trick of speech, used the weaker statement in
order to express a stronger meaning. The earl,  in his reply, “By God, sir king, I shall
neither go nor hang” (g'h'), secures emphasis of a more direct kind by flatly denying even
the king’s weak disjunctive, instead of the much stronger conditional statement which
would more logically,  though less emphatically,  express the king’s real  meaning.  The
denial of “If you won’t go, I will have you hanged,” would be the very mild assertion, “I
may refuse to go without your having me hanged,” a mode of speech which would not at
all have suited the temper of Earl Bigod.
29 As an instance of a simple unconditional disjunctive, we may take the statement, “We
shall  either  go  to  Brighton or  Hastings  this  summer.”  There  appears  to  me to  be  a
fundamental difference between the class of disjunctives of which this is a type, and the
conditional  class  of  disjunctives  previously  illustrated.  At  the  same  time  it  must  be
admitted that in common language, just as statements which are conditional in meaning
are often expressed in a disjunctive form, so real disjunctives unconditional in meaning
are often expressed in a conditional form. The last example, for instance, “We shall either
go to Brighton or to Hastings this summer,” might, according to usage and without any
perceptible  difference  of  meaning,  be  expressed  as  “If  we  don’t  go  to  Brighton this
summer,  we shall  go to Hastings,” or in the same words with Brighton and Hastings
interchanged.  The  fact,  however,  that  conditionals  and  disjunctives  are  frequently
confounded in ordinary untechnical language, is no reason why they should be so in
formal or symbolical logic. Even if I have not succeeded in satisfactorily proving that a : b 
and a' + b are not synonymous, it is safest, I think, to adopt my view in actual practice. Let
it be observed that the hypothesis of non-equivalence commits one to less, and therefore
involves less risk to the inferred conclusions. My critics admit with me that (a : b) : ( a' + b)
is a correct formula; but they would also add the formula a' + b : (a : b), the validity of
which I deny. If I am wrong, I am open to the charge of seeking to deprive logic of a new
formula which might possibly prove useful, but whose utility has yet to be proved. If my
opponents are wrong, they are open to the graver charge of seeking to introduce an
erroneous formula, which not only can render no service in reasoning, but might even
seriouslyendanger our conclusions.
30 As this article is  an attempt to explain and illustrate the laws which necessitate the
growth, and the principles which determine the form, of a symbolical language, I hope it
will  not be considered either irrelevant or egotistical,  if  I  give a brief account of the
development of my own method. By “my own method” I mean simply the method which I
discovered (including those features which it has in common with the prior methods of
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others), as well as those characteristics which are peculiar to itself. What these are I leave
to others to decide. The question is certainly irrelevant to the expressed object of this
article; and its discussion would only provoke the natural impatience of the reader. I only
mention this at all in order to explain that I use the possessive pronoun my merely as a
convenient abbreviation, and in a sense which cannot possibly give offence to any of my
fellow workers.
31 As I stated in my third paper in the ‘Proceedings’ of the London Mathematical Society, my
method originated in a question in probability proposed in the ‘Educational Times’ for
June 1871‡. The question (as I understood it) may be thus generalized : —“Given that the
variables x, y, z are each taken at random between given limits, what is the chance that an
assigned function of these variables, say ɸ (x,  y,  z), will be real and positive?” When I
began to solve the problem I found that, in addition to the particular event whose chance
was required, I should have to consider the relations in which this event stood towards
several other events on which it more or less depended. It struck me that it would help
the memory and facilitate the reasoning, if I registered the various events spoken of in
regular numerical order in a table of reference. The event whose chance had to be found
resolved itself into a concurrence of two distinct but not independent events 1 and 2; and
I denoted the chance (or probability) of  this concurrence by the symbol p(1 ∙ 2).  The
compound event 1 ∙ 2 implied the occurrence of a third event , which it was necessary
also to take into account;  I  had therefore to replace p(1 ∙ 2)  by p(1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3).  But the
consideration of 1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3 could not be separated from the consideration of a fourth event
4, in conjunction with which it might happen, but not necessarily; and the probability of
the concurrence 1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3 depended materially upon whether it happened in conjunction
with this fourth event or without it. Denoting the non-occurrence of this fourth event by
the  symbol : 4,  I  thus  had  the  equation  p(1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3) =  p(1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3∙ 4) =  p(1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3 : 4).
Proceeding  in  this  way,  but  in  a  somewhat  groping  and  tentative  manner,  I  finally
resolved the problem into a  form which brought  it  within the reach of  the integral
calculus; in other words, I had somehow determined the limits of integration, though I hardly
knew how. I applied the same method successfully to two or three other problems in the
‘Educational Times,’  but without being able to make any material  improvement in it.
Whilst occupied with these researches, the editor of the ‘Educational Times’ sent me a
very neat and simple geometrical solution by Mr. G. S. Carr of the very problem which
had given me so much trouble. This so discouraged me (in the belief that I was only
wasting my time) that I threw up the whole subject in disgust, and determined for the
future to eschew all mathematics that did not fall within the very narrow limits of my
requirements as a teacher.
32 When six  years  afterwards,  I  broke  my resolution and again  took  up the  subject  of
probability, my mind naturally reverted to the old abandoned method; and it then struck
me that, with all its defects, it had one important merit, namely independence of geometrical
diagrams, and  that,  consequently,  it  would  be  well  worth  my  while  to  apply  myself
patiently to the task of removing its defects and developing it, if possible, into something
better.
33 My first  step was to drop the letter (for probability),  which I  thought might,  without
ambiguity be left understood; so that, for instance, 1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3 should replace p(1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3) as
an abbreviation for “the probability of the event 1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3.” My next step was to use
letters instead of numbers, as A B C instead of 1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3, and an accent to denote non-
occurrence, as ABCinstead of 1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3. But at this point a difficulty presented itself: how
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was A B C, the chance of the compound event A B C, to be distinguished from A B C, the
product of the chances A, B, C? for the chance of the compound event would not generally
be  the  product  of  the  chances  of  the  separate  events.  To  guard against  this  risk  of
confusion I decided to use capitals, as A B C, when the chance of the whole compound
event was meant, and small italic letters, a, b, c, when the product of the separate chances
a, b, c was meant. Thus, though the chances A, B, C were separately equal to a, b, c, the
symbol A B C would not (except in the case of independent events) be equivalent to the
symbol a,  b,  c.  The equivalence of A (B + C) and A B + A C, and of similar expressions, I
discovered before I introduced letters instead of numbers.
34 So far, I had made no real advance: the substitution of a literal for a numerical notation
improved perhaps the appearance of the method; but it did not affect it practically. In
applying the method to such questions as required the integral calculus it still remained a
tentative method; I still groped my way towards conclusions in particular cases without
the help of any general rules of procedure. At last I was struck by the fact that the events
registered in my tables, and whose chances were denoted by the letters, were all of the
form x > x1, x2 > x, x2 > x1, y > y1, y2 > y, y2 > y1, &c., and had all reference to the limits of the
different variables. This suggested the idea of a partial return to the original numerical
notation and classifying the events according to the variable spoken of. I denoted the
event and also the chance of the event x > x1 by x1, the event x1 > x and its chance by x1,
and so on for x2, x2', x3, x3', , y1, y1', &c. This was a very important step so far as my method
related  to  integration  limits;  and  after  this  its  development  in  this  direction  was
comparatively  rapid—too much so for  me to  remember  very  accurately  its  different
stages.  Still,  I  looked upon the method as essentially and inseparably connected with
probability;  and even when I had decided that it  would be more convenient and less
confusing to let my symbols denote logical statements rather than mathematical chances, I
could not for some time turn to any account the independence of mathematics which I
had thus secured for the method. The notion of the mutual exclusiveness of events (or
statements) connected by the sign clung to the method to a very late period; in fact, I was
in the very act of writing my first article “On Symbolical Reasoning” for the ‘Educational
Times,’ when the needlessness of this restriction occurred to me. I had written down my
definitions of the equations A B C = 1 and A B C = 0 in the following words: — 
The equation A B C = 1 asserts that all three statements are true;
the equation A B C = 0 asserts that all the three statements are not true, i.e. that at
least one of the three is false; 
35 and I had to consider suitable definitions of the equations A + B + C = 1 and A + B + C = 0. It
was quite evident that the equation A + B + C = 0, whether the statements A, B, C were
mutually exclusive or not, must assert that all the three statements are false; and the very
words  used in the previous definitions of  A B C =  1  and A B C =  0  suggested that,  as  a
symmetrical complement of this, the equation A + B + C = 1 should assert that all the three
statements are not false, i.e. that at least one of the three is true. The only question to
decide was whether the rule of multiplication,(A + B) (C + D) = A C + A D + B C + B D, would
still hold good. A very little consideration showed that it would; so, though the method
was correct, so far as it went, on either supposition, I judged it wiser to leave room for
possible future development by adopting the wider rather than the narrower hypothesis
for its basis.
36 Finding myself thus, at the end of my investigation, on logical instead of mathematical
ground, I naturally began to study the relation in which my method stood towards the
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ordinary  logic,  and  especially  towards  the  syllogism.  The  only  book  on  logic  that  I
possessed was Prof. Bain’s work; and to this I turned. The resemblance which my method
bore to Boole’s, as therein described, of course struck me at once; but Boole’s treatment
of the syllogism was more likely to put me on the wrong track than to help me. As my
most elementary symbols denoted statements, not necessarily connected with quantity at
all, I could not see how the syllogism, with its ever recurring all,  some, none, could be
brought within the reach of my method. The Cartesian system of analytical geometry at
last supplied the desiderated hint as to the proper mode of procedure. In this system, as
every mathematician knows, one single point is spoken of in every equation, but with the
understanding that it is a representative point, and that the equational statement made
respecting it  is  also  true  respecting every other  point  in  the  locus  expressed bythis
equational statement.
37 The  symbol  :,  which  I  had  already  begun  to  use  as  an  occasionally  convenient
abbreviation for the word “implies,” now became almost imperative. Syllogistic reasoning
is  strictly  restricted  to  classification. The  statement  “All  X is  Y”  is  equivalent  to  the
conditional statement “If any thing belongs to the class X, it must also belong to the class
Y.” Speaking then of something originally unclassed, if x denote the statement “It belongs
to  the class  X,”  and if  y denote  the  statement  “It  belongs  to  the  class  Y,”  then the
implicational statement x : y (or x implies y) will be equivalent to the syllogistic statement
“All X is Y.”
38 It was evident after this that x : y' would be the proper symbolical expression for “No X is
Y;” but, strange to say, the discovery of the suitable symbolic expressions for “Some X is Y
” and “some X is not Y ” caused me no small trouble, even though I had previously more
than once wondered under what circumstances the symbol (x : y)' would be required. For
a long time I did not recognize this (x : y)' as the equivalent (in classi[fi]cation) of “Some X
is not Y,” and (x : y')' as the equivalent of “Some X is Y.” In my second communication to
the Mathematical Society I used the symbol v : xy to denote “Some X is Y;” and it was only
when I had read the very just objection made by one of the referees to my introduction of
the arbitrary and possibly non-existent class V that it suddenly flashed upon me that the
true  symbolical  expression  for  “Some  X is  Y ”  should  be  ( x : y')',  the  denial  of  the
implication x : y', and that the true symbolical expression for “Some X is not Y ” should be
(x : y)', the denial of x : y.
39 The next new symbol to be introduced into my symbolic system was the symbol x
a
, to
express the chance of x being true on the assumption that a is true. The circumstances which
suggested this symbol to me are curious and instructive. My first idea was to use the
symbol x
c
 to denote the chance of x being true, the suffix c being merely suggestive of the
word chance and not denoting a statement. In fact, this was the notation which originally
formed the basis of my fourth paper, “On the Calculus of Equivalent Statements,” when it
was first communicated to the London Mathematical Society. While this paper was in the
hands of the referees, I was occupied with a problem proposed to me by Mr. C. J. Monro,
and involving among other things the consideration of a chance (xz)
c
,  which I at first
considered  as  equal  to  x
c
 (x : z)
c
,  being  under  the  idea  that,  since  x : z expressed  the
conditional statement “If x is true z is true,” (x : z)
c
 would be the proper symbol to express
the chance that if x is true z is true. On reflexion I discovered that this, plausible as it
sounded, would lead to inconsistency of notation. For, since x : z is equivalent to z' : x',
consistency of notation required that (x : z)
c
 should denote the same chance as (z' : x')
c
;
and, as I had interpreted the symbols, this would not be the case. The chance that z is true,
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on the assumption that is true, is not generally equal to the chance that x is false on the
assumption that z is false. I was thus forced to the conclusion that I had put a wrong
interpretation on the symbols (x : z)
c
 and (z' : x')
c
,  which must be equivalent,  and that
neither of them, therefore,  was the proper symbol for the chance which I  wished to
express. It became necessary, therefore, since there did not appear to be sufficient data
for logically inferring a correct expression for this chance, to invent a new and arbitrary
symbol for it; and then the important question presented itself as to what that symbol
should be. It must, if possible, be brief and easily formed; it must be formed, at least
partly, of the symbols and z; and yet it must be some unambiguous combination of those
symbols—that is to say, a combination which should convey no other meaning either by
definition or by implication. One of several symbols that offered themselves as candidates
for the important post to be filled, I at last selected the symbol z
x
 as the one most likely to
perform effectively the duties required of it.
40 The symbol z
x
 being thus fairly installed, I was struck by the resemblance between it in
some respects and the symbol z
c
. Both expressed the chance of the truth of z, though on
generally different assumptions; and, what was more remarkable, some of the formulae
which I had obtained involving the constant suffix c, as 
(α + β)
c
 = α
c
 + β
c
 – (αβ)
c
 ,
were also true when for c I substituted the variable suffix x. This suggested the propriety
of considering c too as a statement, instead of a mere arbitrary abbreviation for “the
chance of the truth of,” and it soon became evident what that statement must be. The
constant suffix c, like the variable suffix x, must denote a statement taken for granted; but,
unlike the variable x, it must denote a statement whose truth is taken for granted always
—that is, throughout the whole of an investigation. In other words, the suffix c must be an
exact equivalent for the logical symbol 1. 
41 This,  however,  necessitated  other  symbolical  changes.  As  long  as  the  suffixc did  not
denote a statement, I was at liberty to use this letter in conjunction with the letters and in 
other positions as a statement; so that c
c
 (like a
c
 and b
c
) would simply denote the chance of
the truth of the statement c, and its value might vary from to ; but with the new meaning
of the suffix c, we should always have c
c
 = 1. It thus became expedient to leave c at liberty
to discharge other functions in company with its old comrades a and b, and to intrust the
duty of denoting universally admitted statements to some letter whose services in other
capacities could be more easily spared. I decided, after some hesitation, on the Greek
letter ε,  which is easily formed, pleasing to the eye, and not often wanted. It may be
asked,  why was I  not satisfied with the symbol ,  which already denoted an admitted
statement? My answer is, first, that I thought this numeral would not look well in frequent
companionship with literal suffixes; and, next, that I thought it better to reserve it, in
company with other numerals, for distinguishing statements of the same class or series,
as a1, a2, a3 &c., which, though different statements, will generally be found to have some
common factor or characteristic a.
42 Having thus decided that ε should denote a statement of acknowledged truth, that x
a
should denote the chance of the truth of x on the assumption that a is true, and that
therefore xε must simply denote the chance that x is true, with no assumption beyond the
understood data of the problem, it soon became evident that this notation would express
many of the laws of probability in neat and compact formulae, and also that it would
contribute towards precision of reasoning from its constant reference, by means of its
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suffixes,  to  the  assumptions  on which any argument  in  probability  rested.  It  is  well
known that of all mathematical subjects probability is the one in which mistakes are most
apt to be made; and these mistakes are usually the result of correct reasoning based upon
unperceived false assumptions. These assumptions, for the most part, would be readily
seen to be false, if they were only expressed; a notation therefore that actually forces them
on the attention must be considered as possessing one very important advantagein that
fact alone.
43 As this new scheme of probability-notation quite superseded that which formed the basis
of  the paper which had been already submitted to the referees  of  the Mathematical
Society, these gentlemen naturally declined (on the scheme being communicated to them
through the Honorary Secretary, Mr. Tucker) to pronounce any opinion either upon the
original paper or on the proposed alterations, till the whole was recast and rewritten.
When this was done, and the paper again submitted to them, they advised its publication.
44 In my former paper in ‘Mind,’  “On Symbolical  Reasoning,”  I  referred to the analogy
between the relation connecting antecedent and consequent in logic and that connecting
subject and predicate in grammar. Would it be presumptuous to suggest as a probable
hypothesis that this analogy is more than a mere coincidence, and that it really points to
an original identity? It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that in the very early stage
of human speech, each separate word represented a complete statement and conveyed its
own independent information. On this supposition, the growth of vocal language would
proceed  according  to  laws  in  some  respects  analogous  to  those  which  shape  the
development of  a  language of  symbols.  Our abstract  nouns,  for  instance,  seem to be
nothing but abbreviations for original  statements.  Take the compact and well-known
saying,  “Unity  is  strength.”  What  is  this  but  an  abbreviation  for  the  conditional
statement,  “If  a  company be united, they will  be  strong”? or,  as  it  may be otherwise
expressed, “If the statement symbolized by the abbreviation unity for ‘They are united’ be
applicable  to  a  company  of  persons,  so  will  also  the  statement  symbolized  by  the
abbreviation strength for ‘They are strong.’ ”
45 But here I must stop. Speculations as to the primaeval forms of human speech do not
come fairly within the limits prescribed by the title of this article; and further discussion
of the subject in this direction would therefore be irrelevant.
NOTES
†.  To avoid the employment of brackets and repetition as much as possible, itwill be convenient
to use both, with this distinction, that the symbols : and ∷ should be coordinate (i.e. of equal reach
in regard to the statements affected by them), but both subordinate (i.e. of inferior reach) to the
symbol =.
Thus, a : b +c ∷ d + e : f ∷ gis an abbreviation for the complex statement
(a : b +c)(b + c∷d + e)(d + e : f)(f ∷ g)
while a : b +c = d + c : f ∷ g is an abbreviation for
(a : b +c) = (d + c : f ∷ g)
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‡.  The subject of probability was one which I had recently taken up at the request of Mr. J. C.
Miller, the mathematical editor of the ‘Educational Times,’ who felt great interest in it himself,
and strongly recommended it as “an unworked vein in which I should find many treasures.”
F0
2A.  That the conceptions which underlie the very elements of symbolical mathematics are by no
means easy to grasp will be admitted by any one who has attempted to explain to beginners the
real logical meaning of the “Rule of Signs” in multiplication and division of ordinary algebra.
This difficulty meets the tyro on the very threshold of the science. When he has advanced a few
steps further, he is confronted with a symbolical paradox which it has taxed the ingenuity of the
subtlest mathematical intellects to explain, and of which no rational explanation whatever was
given until within very recent times; I allude to the useful and important yet perplexing symbol
√1.
ABSTRACTS
This  paper  discusses  in  a  general  way  the  cases  in  which  symbols  may  be  advantageously
employed in logical and mathematical reasoning, and endeavours, from an examination of our
existing stock of  symbols,  to  deduce some rules  or  guiding principles,  first,  as  to  when new
symbols should be introduced, and secondly, as to what kinds of symbols should be selected. It
also contains a brief account of the gradual development of the author’s own symbolic method,
as explained and set forth in his papers published in the Proceedings of the London Mathematical
Society, the Educational Times, the Philosophical Magazine, and Mind.
[Résumé: Cet article discute de façon générale les cas dans lesquels les symboles peuvent être
utilisés de façon avantageuse dans le raisonnement logique et mathématique, et aspire, par un
examen des symboles déjà existants, à déterminer quelques règles ou principes, d’abord, quant à
l’opportunité d’introduire de nouveaux symboles, puis, quant au types de symboles qui doivent
être sélectionnés. Cet article contient aussi une brève histoire du développement graduel de la
méthode symbolique propre à l’auteur, telle qu’elle a été présentée et expliquée par l’auteur dans
ses articles publiés dans les Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, le Educational Times, le
Philosophical Magazine, et Mind.]
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